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David Richman and Edward R. Cohen argued before both the panel and 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge: 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
This matter is before this court on an appeal from an 
order entered February 17, 1998, in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In 
1995, appellant Michael Collins brought this action under 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his 
constitutional rights while he was incarcerated in the 
Montgomery County Correctional Facility in Montgomery 
County, Pennsylvania. The court granted Collins leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis on July 26, 1995, and on 
November 17, 1995, Collins moved for appointment of 
counsel. Upon request of the district court, the firm of 
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz agreed to represent Collins in 
pursuing several of his claims. The district court made this 
appointment on January 31, 1996. 
 
On April 26, 1996, approximately three months after 
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz agreed to represent Collins and 
less than three months after the district court made the 
appointment, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), 
became effective. The PLRA significantly limits the 
attorney's fees that a court may award a prisoner 
recovering a monetary judgment in a civil rights action by 
placing a cap both on an attorney's maximum hourly rate 
and on the total amount of attorney's fees recoverable from 
a defendant. Moreover, the PLRA requires that a portion of 
a monetary judgment recovered by a plaintiff be applied to 
satisfy attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(d). 
 
Collins' action was tried in December 1996, after the 
effective date of the PLRA, before a jury that returned a 
verdict against two of the ten defendants and awarded 
Collins compensatory damages of $15,000 and punitive 
damages of $5,000 on a claim arising out of an attack on 
him by a guard dog. As a partially successful civil rights 
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litigant under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, Collins moved for an award 
of attorney's fees of $80,122.75 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 1988.2 Collins recognized the possible effect of the PLRA 
on his application but raised an equal protection challenge 
to the Act. Subsequently, on July 11, 1997, the court 
permitted the United States to intervene under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2403 to defend the constitutionality of the PLRA. 
 
The court in an opinion dated January 9, 1998, held that 
Collins' application for attorney's fees for services performed 
after the PLRA became effective on April 26, 1996, was 
subject to the PLRA's attorney's fees limitations. The court, 
however, in a determination not challenged on this appeal, 
held that Collins was entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
for pre-PLRA legal services without regard for the Act's 
limitations. It accordingly directed Collins to submit a 
revised fee petition conforming with the PLRA for the time 
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz spent both in and out of court 
after April 26, 1996. Moreover, the court upheld the 
constitutionality of the attorney's fees provisions of the 
PLRA. 
 
On January 26, 1998, Collins filed a revised fee petition 
that sought an award of $7,789.75 without regard for the 
PLRA limitations for services before April 26, 1996, but 
which reduced his request for services performed thereafter 
from $72,333 to $30,000 in compliance with the PLRA. 
Collins calculated this post-PLRA figure as $30,025.30 in 
gross fees, based on the applicable hourly rate, reduced by 
$25.50 in accordance with the PLRA limitations. The 
defendants raised no issue with respect to mathematical 
calculations in this revised petition with respect to services 
either before or after the enactment of the PLRA, and the 
district court granted this revised fee petition by order 
entered on February 17, 1998. The court at that time 
divided the responsibility for the attorney's fees subject to 
the PLRA on the basis of 97.5% or $29,250 to the 
defendants and 2.5% or $750 to Collins. Collinsfiled a 
timely notice of appeal from this fee award on March 13, 
1998.3 The defendants have not cross-appealed and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. He also moved for costs but the parties raise no issue regarding costs 
on this appeal. 
 
3. The defendants (not including the United States) contend that Collins' 
appeal is untimely because he filed it more than 30 days after the 
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consequently they acquiesce in the district court's 
allowance of fees for pre-PLRA services without regard for 
the Act's limitations. The district court had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S S 1331, 1343(a), and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Following argument before the 
original panel, the full court voted that the case be 
considered en banc, and the parties thereafter reargued the 
case before the en banc court. See Third Circuit Internal 
Operating Procedure 9.4. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
On this appeal, we are asked to answer two questions: (1) 
whether a court should apply the PLRA's attorney's fee 
limitation provisions to prisoner civil rights cases pending 
at the time of its enactment and, if so, (2) whether the 
PLRA's attorney's fee provisions violate the equal protection 
of the law guarantee inherent in the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.4 Because these issues 
present questions of law, our review is plenary. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
district court's January 9, 1998 order. As we have explained, attorney's 
fee awards are not appealable until the court determines their amount. 
See Government Guar. Fund of the Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 95 
F.3d 291, 308 (3d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, because Collins filed his 
notice of appeal less than 30 days after entry of the district court's 
February 17, 1998 order awarding a quantified amount of attorney fees, 
his appeal is timely. 
 
4. The defendants (other than the United States) argue that because 
Collins cashed his check for attorney's fees, which included an accord 
and satisfaction notation, he has waived any right to appeal the district 
court's fee award. It is well settled, however, that where a judgment is 
appealed on the ground that the damages awarded are inadequate, 
acceptance of payment of the amount of the judgment, standing alone, 
does not amount to an accord and satisfaction of the entire claim. See 
United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 312, 81 S.Ct. 13, 16 (1960). 
The defendants knew that Collins was unsatisfied with his fee award; 
Collins filed and served his notice of appeal prior to cashing his check. 
In addition, the defendants do not contend that they sent the check 
pursuant to any settlement negotiations or agreement. In these 
circumstances, Collins has not waived his right to appeal by cashing his 
check. 
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A. Retroactivity Questions 
 
The PLRA's attorney's fee limitation provisions are found 
at 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(d), which provides in relevant part: 
 
       (d) Attorney's Fees 
 
        (1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is 
       confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional 
       facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized under 
       [42 U.S.C. S 1988], such fees shall not be awarded, 
       except to the extent that-- 
 
         (A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in 
       proving an actual violation of the plaintiff 's rights 
       protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be 
       awarded under [42 U.S.C. S 1988]; and 
 
         (B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately 
       related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or 
 
         (ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in 
       enforcing the relief ordered for the violation. 
 
        (2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an 
       action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the 
       judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to 
       satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against 
       the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not 
       greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess 
       shall be paid by the defendant. 
 
        (3) No award of attorney's fees in an action described 
       in paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate 
       greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established 
       under section 3006A of Title 18[, the Criminal Justice 
       Act,] for payment of court-appointed counsel . . . . 
 
These PLRA attorney's fee limitation provisions raise 
three retroactivity questions here. With respect to 
consideration of compensation based on the time a 
plaintiff 's attorney has expended on the case, the PLRA 
limits attorney's fees to an hourly rate not greater than 
150% of the hourly rate for court-appointed counsel 
established under the Criminal Justice Act in the 
applicable district. In this case, the hourly rates allowed on 
the basis of 150% of the Criminal Justice Act rates were 
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$97.50 for court time and $67.50 for time out of court. As 
we have indicated, however, the court applied the 
limitations only to services after the effective date of the 
PLRA, and the defendants do not contend that the 
limitations should have been applied to earlier services. 
Collins contends, however, that the hourly rate provisions 
should not be applied at all in this action as hefiled it 
before the enactment of the PLRA. 
 
Another limitation is predicated on the amount of the 
recovery and provides that the fees awarded cannot exceed 
150% of the judgment. In this case, as the judgment was 
for $20,000, the district court capped the fee at $30,000. In 
this regard, we point out that the defendants do not 
contend that the fees awarded Collins' attorneys for pre- 
PLRA services should count against the $30,000 cap and 
thus the district court applied the cap only against the fees 
for post-PLRA services. Inasmuch as the fees for post-PLRA 
services calculated on the basis of the hourly rate limitation 
was $30,025.30, the capping provision reduced the 
attorney's fees by the nominal amount of $25.30 to 
$30,000. Collins nevertheless contends that the cap should 
not be applied in this case in any degree as hefiled it 
before the enactment of the PLRA. 
 
The third provision is a fee limitation only in the sense 
that it places responsibility for the fees on the plaintiff by 
requiring that a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 
25%) be applied to satisfy the award of attorney's fees. Here 
the district court allotted 2.5% of the responsibility for the 
fee to Collins.5 Collins contends that no portion of his 
judgment should have been applied to the attorney's fees. 
 
Congress did not clearly define the temporal reach of any 
of the three limitation provisions so we must consider 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Conceivably, depending upon the amount of the judgment and of the 
attorney's fees awarded, the plaintiff could be responsible for all of the 
fees. We point out that there might be some difficult questions raised in 
a case in which a prisoner obtains extensive and important equitable 
relief and a modest award of damages. Perhaps in such a case an 
attorney's fee would not be limited by the cap in 42 U.S.C. 
S 1997(e)(d)(2). We, however, leave that question to another day as 
Collins recovered only monetary damages. 
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whether as applied here they have a retroactive effect. See 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 
1483, 1505 (1994). The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 158 
F.3d 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1998), recently addressed this issue in 
part. The court concluded that it would join the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Williams v. Brimeyer, 122 
F.3d 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 1997), "in holding that 
retroactivity concerns are not implicated when the statute 
is applied to work performed after April 26, 1996, the date 
of passage of the PLRA." Inmates of D.C. Jail, 158 F.3d at 
1360. The court went on to explain: 
 
        When it is applied to work performed after the 
       effective date of the Act, the PLRA raises none of the 
       retroactivity concerns that require the analysis used by 
       the district court because the statute creates present 
       and future effects on present and future conduct, and 
       has no effect on past conduct. Compare [Jensen v. 
       Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191, 1203 (8th Cir. 1996)] (holding 
       that the PLRA did not apply to pre-Act work) with 
       Williams, 122 F.3d at 1094 (holding that as applied to 
       work performed after the passage of the Act, there is no 
       retroactivity). The fees at issue were earned after the 
       PLRA passed. The PLRA does not in this case upset 
       vested interests because no right to a fee existed until 
       the work was done. Because we find no retroactive 
       effect, we need not consider the Supreme Court's 
       extensive analysis of when to permit retroactive 
       application. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. 244; [Lindh v. 
       Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997)]. As the 
       Supreme Court stated in Landgraf, normally a court is 
       to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its 
       decision. 511 U.S. at 264 (quoting Bradley v. School 
       Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 
       L.Ed.2d 476 (1974)). 
 
        In Landgraf, the Supreme Court noted that it has 
       adopted a functional definition of retroactivity. See id. 
       at 268-69 & n.23. In Miller v. Florida, it stated that [a] 
       law is retrospective if it changes the legal consequences 
       of acts completed before its effective date. 482 U.S. 
       423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) . . . . 
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       To determine if a statute has retroactive effect, the 
       court must decide whether it would impair rights a 
       party possessed when he acted, increase a party's 
       liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
       respect to transactions already completed. Landgraf, 
       511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. In determining 
       whether the statute has retroactive effect, the court 
       should consider fair notice, reasonable reliance, and 
       settled expectations. Id. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483. In this 
       case, the work at issue was not done until after the 
       passage of the Act. The attorneys did not possess a 
       right to payment until they performed the work for 
       which the fees were awarded, and thus had no settled 
       expectations. Simply put, as applied in this case, the 
       PLRA does not impair rights or upset expectations that 
       did not exist prior to its passage, and could not exist 
       after its passage. Because we hold only that the fee 
       limitations apply to work performed after the passage 
       of the Act, there is no need to continue the retroactivity 
       analysis. 
 
Inmates of D.C. Jail, 158 F.3d at 1360-61 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court in Inmates of 
D.C. Jail held "that applying the fee-capping provisions of 
[42 U.S.C. S 1997e(d) ] to work performed after April 26, 
1996, does not implicate retroactivity concerns." Id. at 
1361. 
 
We agree with the foregoing analysis, and thus we follow 
it.6 While Inmates of D.C. Jail was not concerned with the 
limitation provision based on the size of the judgment, that 
provision raises no additional retroactivity problems here as 
the district court awarded Collins fees for pre-PLRA services 
on an hourly basis without regard for any of the PLRA's 
limitations. Thus, we hold that the attorney's fees limitation 
provisions of the PLRA predicated on hourly rates and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We are aware of but do not follow Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th 
Cir.), cert. granted, 119 S.Ct. 508 (1998), which reached a contrary 
result. We have no reason to express an opinion on whether the PLRA 
limitations could be applied to cap fees for services performed before its 
effective date as the defendants do not contend that it should be so 
applied. 
 
                                9 
  
amount of the judgment simply do not have retroactive 
effect, at least when, as here, a court applies them solely to 
limit fees awarded for services performed after the effective 
date of the Act based on a judgment entered after that date. 
See also Madrid v. Gomez, 150 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 
1998).7 
 
We, however, face a question not involved in Inmates of 
D.C. Jail, namely whether the PLRA provision that requires 
application of a portion of the judgment to payment of 
attorney's fees has a retroactive effect. See Mathews v. 
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156, 159-60 (3d Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 1999 WL 86955 (Apr. 19, 1999) (No. 98- 
1319). The Supreme Court in Landgraf indicated that to 
determine whether a statute has retroactive effect a court 
must decide, inter alia, whether "it would impair rights a 
party possessed when he acted." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 
114 S.Ct. at 1505. 
 
Here the application of a portion of the judgment to the 
attorney's fees does have a retroactive effect because under 
42 U.S.C. S 1988 when Collins brought this action he could 
have anticipated applying to the court for an award of all of 
his reasonable attorney's fees. While undoubtedly even 
before the enactment of the PLRA various factors might 
have limited the amount of the award, see Washington v. 
Philadelphia County Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031 (3d 
Cir. 1996), when Collins brought this action and then 
applied for the appointment of counsel prior to the PLRA's 
enactment, he had no reason to believe that the court 
would order that a portion of his judgment, if he obtained 
one, would be used to satisfy the attorney's fees that the 
court awarded. Moreover, the various factors that could 
have led a court before enactment of the PLRA to reduce a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Our result is not inconsistent with our opinion in Gibbs v. Ryan, 160 
F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 1998), in which we held that the three strikes 
provision of the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. S 1915(g), did not permit the district 
court to revoke an order granting in forma pauperis status entered prior 
to the effective date of the PLRA. In Gibbs we pointed out that the three 
strikes provision limited a prisoner's right to "bring a civil action or 
appeal a judgment." 160 F.3d at 162. Obviously, in Gibbs the prisoner 
already had brought his action before the enactment of the PLRA. In this 
case the fees were awarded after the enactment of the PLRA. 
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fee application continue to be applicable after its 
enactment. Thus, we see no escape from the conclusion 
that the PLRA has a retroactive effect in this case to the 
extent that it requires that a portion of a judgment be 
applied to pay attorney's fees. 
 
The PLRA does not indicate whether 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(d) 
should be applied retroactively, and we find no clear 
congressional intent from any other source to apply the 
statute retroactively. In these circumstances, we will apply 
the judicial default rule recognized in Landgraf that when 
Congress does not state its intent with respect to 
retroactivity a statute with a retroactive effect will be 
applied prospectively. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, S.Ct. 
at 1505; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2062 
(1997); Mathews, 161 F.3d at 159-60. Consequently, we 
will modify the order of February 17, 1998, to the extent 
that it applied a portion of the judgment to satisfy 
attorney's fees by eliminating that provision. 
 
B. Constitutional Questions 
 
Collins argues that the PLRA's attorney's fee limitation 
provisions violate equal protection of the law by 
withdrawing from prisoners but not other plaintiffs the 
right under 42 U.S.C. S 1988 to an award of reasonable 
attorney's fees upon prevailing in a civil rights action. 
Collins contends that by "virtually eliminating the potential 
for a prisoner's recovery of reasonable fees, the Act severely 
impairs the ability of prisoners to obtain counsel without 
similarly affecting the ability of non-prisoners." 
 
In this case we are concerned only with the 
constitutionality of the attorney's fee limitation provisions 
limiting the attorney's fees to 150% of the judgment and 
limiting the hourly rates to 150% of the hourly rates for 
court-appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice Act in 
the applicable district. Obviously, we do not face any 
constitutional question with respect to application of a 
portion of the judgment to satisfaction of the attorney's fees 
as we have eliminated that application in this case on a 
nonconstitutional basis. 
 
We have divided equally on the question of whether the 
limitation of the fees to 150% of the judgment is 
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constitutional and consequently we will affirm the order of 
the district court to the extent that it upheld that provision. 
This disposition renders the constitutional challenge to the 
hourly rate limitation provision moot as the hourly rate 
limitation standing alone would allow Collins $30,025.30 in 
fees, a sum exceeding the $30,000 cap predicated on 150% 
of the judgment. Consequently, an invalidation of the 
hourly rate limitation could not enhance the fees allowed 
for no matter what the hourly rate allowed for Collins' 
attorneys' services the fee cannot exceed $30,000 for post- 
PLRA services. Therefore, we will not decide whether the 
hourly rate limitation violates a prisoner's rights to equal 
protection of the law. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will modify the order of 
February 17, 1998, to the extent that it allocated $750 of 
the attorney's fee to Collins and will remand the case to the 
district court to enter an amended order reflecting our 
determination. Thus, the defendants against whom the 
monetary damages judgment was entered will be 
responsible for the entire $30,000 fee. We otherwise will 
affirm the order of February 17, 1998. The parties will bear 
their own costs on this appeal. 
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